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Abstract 
This paper investigates the budgetary experience of the PA so far, discusses the 
constraints on the use of fiscal policy in a new Palestinian state and examines the 
range of structural challenges which fiscal policy will have to confront, from 
reconstruction and development to demographic changes and immigration. It argues 
that the constraints arising from the fiscal structure (eg high dependence on indirect 
taxes and customs duties) and from the likely monetary arrangements mean that fiscal 
policy will have to be relatively conservative. The fiscal challenges are not 
insuperable but the reforms, which the PA has already initiated, will need to be taken 
further.    1
1 INTRODUCTION 
Between 1967 and 1994, the budgetary policy of the Israeli administration in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) seems to have been much like that of former British 
colonial regimes. Owen and Pamuk (1998: 52) described the major budgetary 
principle of colonial economic practice as follows: ‘Colonies should pay for 
themselves without recourse to special financial assistance from the metropolis. This 
produced pressures for fiscal conservatism including the need to make sure that they 
balanced their budgets. This, in turn, ensured that, given the fact that the first call on 
their resources was to spend money on administration and the police, there were 
usually only small sums left for welfare or public works.’ In the WBGS there was 
little infrastructural spending by the Israeli administration, and health and education 
services were largely provided by NGOs. 
 
The Palestinian Authority (PA) began to function as a fiscal authority in 1994. Since 
that time it has substantially increased its tax-gathering capacity, to a point that 
compares well with other countries in the region. The PA’s expenditure has also been 
substantial and significantly above revenues, but as a result of significant support by 
external donors, most of which went to finance capital expenditures which the PA 
could not fund, the domestic fiscal balance remained moderate. However, it should be 
emphasised that the PA was starting from scratch as an entirely new administration, 
and that its operations were subject to a high degree of political and economic 
turbulence, related in particular to the intensity of closures in 1994-96 and then the 
start of the second intifada in September 2000. 
 
The government of a new Palestinian state will inherit the budgetary and fiscal 
arrangements put in place by the PA. But it will need to move decisively towards a   2
budget that will be self-sustaining at some point in the future. And it will need to cope 
with particular challenges which arise from the need to overcome the effects of 
occupation and conflict, to welcome and absorb a large number of returning refugees, 
and to expand the role of the state to cover a wider range of activities including 
comprehensive health and education provision, pensions and other social support 
programmes. 
  
Section 2 examines the PA’s budget from 1996 to 2003, highlighting some of the key 
structural characteristics of the budget and placing it in a regional and international 
context. In Section 3 we consider the challenges facing a new Palestinian state in 
designing a fiscal programme that is consistent with the needs and aspirations of the 
new state and those it represents. In doing so we focus both on the ‘structural’ aspects 
of fiscal policy design – issues of the structure of taxation, public expenditure, debt 
and the institutions of fiscal management – and on the question of the macroeconomic 
sustainability of the fiscal stance. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2  THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY’S BUDGET 
Overall performance 
Tables 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) provide basic data on the PA’s budget since 1996, including 
the planned budget for 2003, where Table 4.1(b) expresses the fiscal position in terms 
of estimated GDP.
1 The PA began for the first time to raise revenues in its own right 
in 1994, and achieved remarkable success by increasing revenues from 17.6% of GDP 
in 1996 (and 8% in 1994) to consistently over 20% of GDP between 1997 and the 
second intifada in 2000. This is substantially above the average in neighbouring Arab 
countries (IMF, 2003a: 62).    3
 
On the expenditure side, the budget is partitioned between the recurrent budget, which 
was overwhelmingly funded by domestic revenues, and the development budget, a 
large proportion of which has been donor-financed. Soon after the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles (DoP) in 1993 an international conference of donor 
countries was held and pledged $2.4bn to assist the Palestinian reconstruction and 
development programme (1994-99). Further contributions increased the total to 
$3.4bn. The initial understanding between the PA and donors was that funds would 
not be used for short-term budgetary expenditure after 1994, but would be devoted to 
long-term public investment, hence the separation between the two budget 
components. Over time it was anticipated that the PA would make gradually 
increasing contributions to the development budget. While the Authority was moving 
in this direction (the recurrent budget deficit was progressively eliminated between 
1994 and 1999) the adverse conditions caused by closures and the intifada, and then 
by Israel’s withholding of clearance revenues (see below), necessarily reversed this 
trend, with all the aid going to support the budget and nothing to capital expenditure, 
a situation which forced the PA to allocate some money itself to finance certain 
urgently needed capital expenditure.  
 
Over the first half-decade of its existence, the PA was also remarkably successful in 
maintaining a tight control on the level of domestic deficit financing. The PA’s 
overall fiscal deficit declined from almost 12 percent of GDP in 1996 to around 5% in 
1999 (or from around 5% of GDP to a position of overall balance when directly 
foreign-financed expenditures are excluded), and this was accompanied by a sharp 
reduction in the PA’s net domestic deficit (i.e. its direct borrowing from the banking   4
sector). Since then, however, fiscal performance has been severely disrupted by the 
second intifada (which started in September 2000) and the intensification of the Israeli 
closure (physical siege) policy. Domestic revenues declined sharply as the result of 
economic crisis, political turmoil and difficulties in tax collection. Clearance revenues 
collected by the Israeli tax authorities on behalf of the PA also declined, but more 
importantly the Israeli government refused to transfer these monies in 2001 and for all 
except the final month of 2002. By the end of 2002 Israel had transferred only 
NIS556m (16%) out of the NIS3,370m due (see Table 4.1a). At the same time, with 
the sharp drop in the number of Palestinians working in Israel there was strong 
pressure on the PA to increase expenditure and alleviate economic hardship. 
However, expenditure was broadly stabilised, while the large increase in the overall 
fiscal deficit which emerged was made up by increased external finance – partly from 
the European Union and partly from the Arab countries – which was now paid 
directly to the PA and, given the domestic revenue crisis, was increasingly used to 
fund current instead of capital expenditures. As we discuss later, external 
developments and the fiscal reforms underpinning the 2003 budget have helped to 
return the overall fiscal stance to a broadly sustainable position, at least given 
continued levels of external support. 
[Tables 4.1a and 4.1b near here] 
 
It is important to stress, however, that the accounts of the PA do not fully reflect the 
overall fiscal position of the Authority. In particular, the data in Table 4.1 omit some 
important revenues and expenditures. A large part of actual expenditure in the WBGS 
on health, education, social services and maintenance and buildings has been carried 
out by international organisations and foreign financed NGOs. The most important of   5
these is probably the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) which is in 
charge of the welfare of the refugees and refugee camps in the WBGS. Table 4.2 
shows the levels of expenditure by UNRWA in recent years, both in the WBGS and in 
the refugee camps elsewhere. For 2003, for example, UNRWA’s total planned 
expenditure in the WBGS amounted to about $154m, or to some 14% of the planned 
expenditure in the PA budget. On the revenue side, and especially until 2000, certain 
tax and non-tax revenue flows remained off budget. Between 1995 and mid-2000, a 
total of approximately $590m of excise revenues on tobacco, alcohol and petroleum 
were diverted into accounts which were neither under the control of the Ministry of 
Finance nor incorporated in the PA’s budget. As the IMF reports, however, most of 
this revenue – equivalent to around 2.3% of GDP (or 12% of annual PA revenue) per 
annum – was used for investment in PA commercial operations through the 
Palestinian Commercial Services Company (PCSC) (IMF, 2003a: 88-9). The PA 
rapidly acquired a number of commercial assets, many of which were in effect 
awarded monopoly status (notably cement and petroleum), and for several years these 
activities were not publicly accounted for. Other assets (including, for example, a 
stake in ORASCOM Telecommunications) were bought or set up out of diverted tax 
revenues. The PA’s commercial entities, some 67 in total, were highly profitable. The 
IMF report makes a rough estimate of their profits over the years 1995-2000 at around 
$300m, which was also channelled outside the PA budget (IMF, 2003a: 89, 91).  
 
In addition, fees and charges levied by some ministries (health, education, car 
licensing, etc) were paid directly to the ministries’ bank accounts and spent at the 
discretion of ministers, which reduced the Treasury’s ability to control revenues and 
expenditure (IMF, 2003a: 89).    6
 
Key features of the PA’s fiscal operations 
The PA’s short, albeit intensive and occasionally dramatic, experience in fiscal 
matters has revealed a number of bottlenecks and weaknesses. Some of these have 
now been dealt with in the fiscal reform which accompanied the preparation of the 
2003 budget (see below), but others are of a more structural nature and cannot be 
tackled under the present geopolitical and economic constraints. 
 
Tax structure and fiscal leakages 
One of the initial successes of the PA was the creation of a healthy revenue base. 
Between 1994 and 1999 the PA managed to raise revenue to around 21% of GDP, 
which is high relative to both other countries in the region and countries with similar 
structural characteristics. Although the WBGS is currently classified as a lower-
middle-income country its per capita income ($930 per capita) places it in the lowest 
quartile of the lower-middle-income range,
2 while many of its structural 
characteristics, such as relatively low levels of industrialisation, openness to trade, 
and vulnerability to external shocks, mean that its natural comparators consist of low- 
rather than middle-income countries. Estimates for low-income countries suggest that 
revenue mobilisation in the late 1990s averaged between 15% and 18% of GDP (see 
Abed et al, 1998, and Gupta et al, 2002). This level of revenue mobilisation, which is 
much closer to that enjoyed by middle- or upper-middle-income countries, is all the 
more striking given that it has been achieved with tax rates that are relatively modest 
by international standards. 
   7
However, these impressive aggregate figures mask the fact that the PA revenue base 
is disproportionately weighted towards indirect taxes and away from direct income 
taxes. Indirect taxes (domestic indirect taxes plus taxes on trade) account for nearly 
80% of total WBGS revenue, compared to around 50% for Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco 
and Tunisia, a similar share for all low-income countries, and just over 30% for Israel 
(IMF, 2003a: 66, and Adam and Bevan, 2003). This structure is not the outcome of an 
explicit choice over the tax regime but rather reflects the Oslo agreements which 
imposed the overall structure of indirect taxes,
3 the relative efficiency of the Israeli 
clearance and tax-gathering mechanisms, and the effect of the economic and political 
crisis on the PA’s ability to collect income tax.  
 
The high dependence on indirect taxation in general gives rise to a further feature of 
the budget. Tax revenues accrue to the PA through two channels: domestic direct and 
indirect tax collection, and tax clearances remitted by Israel. The former are collected 
by the PA itself, while the latter are collected by Israel on behalf of the Palestinian 
Authority and refunded via clearance procedures which were agreed upon in the Oslo 
Accords. The share of clearance revenues in total revenues increased from 54% to 
63% between 1996 and 2000, and the degree of fiscal vulnerability associated with 
the tax clearance system was dramatically illustrated when Israel stopped the transfers 
in 2001. The tax clearances remitted by Israel to the PA consist of three main flows: 
-  VAT collected by Israel on goods sold by Israel to the Palestinians (against 
invoices)  
-  Customs duties and excise (purchase tax) collected by Israel on goods 
imported through Israel and specified as destined for the WBGS.    8
-  75% of the income tax paid by Palestinians working in Israel (and all the taxes 
paid by Palestinians working in the Israeli settlements). 
While the clearance mechanism was technically efficient, it was also a source of 
disputes (Kanafani, 2001). Actual implementation of the system meant that the PA 
has been losing customs duties on indirect imports, i.e. goods which are re-exported 
by Israel to the WBGS; purchase taxes on (as well as customs duties on the import 
content of) Israeli manufactured products sold to the Palestinians; and customs duties, 
excise taxes and VAT on purchases which are not documented by invoices. 
Conservative estimates of this fiscal leakage (the revenues which accrue to Israel but 
are not transferred to the PA) put the figure at somewhere between 3% (Naqib, 1996) 
and 4.2% (Dumas, 1999) of GDP.
4 
 
Arrears and debt  
Even after external budget support the PA’s budget was running at a small deficit 
during the relatively ‘good’ years of the late 1990s, but it reached alarming levels 
during the crisis years of 2001-2002. The sharp increase in deficit was financed partly 
by borrowing from domestic banks and partly by the accumulation of payment 
arrears. With the suspension of clearance transfers from Israel and the deepening 
fiscal crisis, the PA’s fiscal management came to depend on ‘forced credit’ from the 
private sector. By the end of 2002 the stock of payment arrears was estimated by the 
IMF at $531m, equivalent to around 18% of GDP (or 12% of 2000 GDP, i.e. the level 
of income prevailing before the sharp crisis-induced collapse in GDP) (IMF, 2003a; 
77, 95). The PA also borrowed from the commercial banks and from the PMA. Net 
PA liabilities to domestic commercial banks peaked at the end of 2000, but declined 
slightly by the end of 2002 to $121m, or 4% of GDP (IMF, 2003a: 77). Although the   9
stock of domestic bank debt was low, it was expensive, with interest rates of 10% on 
dollar and 15% on NIS loans. Unlike expenditure arrears, however, which contributed 
to the pressure on the private sector in the WBGS, PA borrowing from the banking 
system is likely to have had a positive effect on the private sector. The banking 
system had always (i.e. since 1993) lent out to the private sector only a relatively low 
proportion of the deposits it took in, and it was even more reluctant to lend under the 
intifada. Its loans to the PA would not therefore have crowded out loans to the private 
sector and, by allowing the PA to pay for more of what it was ordering, would have 
eased the financial pressure on the private sector. 
 
The PA was also accumulating foreign debt. Development expenditure remained 
almost totally financed by foreign donors, but finance was increasingly in the form of 
loans rather than grants. The stock of foreign debt stood at about $530m in mid 1999 
(MAS, 1999), some 13% of GDP, but increased to $872m by 2002 (approximately 
20% of pre-Intifada GDP) (IMF, 2003a: 82).   
 
The true scale of the external debt burden is rather difficult to measure. However, 
most of this debt has been contracted on highly concessional terms and there is a 
reasonable expectation that a significant proportion would be rescheduled and written-
off in due course. Hence in net present value terms, the true external debt burden is 
likely to be significantly less than this 20% figure, even accounting for some 
continued increase over the coming years. This would place a future Palestinian state 
well below the mean levels of external indebtedness for developing countries as a 
whole. For example, the latest figures from the OECD, relating to 1999, estimate the 
nominal average external indebtedness of all developing countries to be   10
approximately 85% of GDP, while Pattillo et al  (2002) report that even after 
accounting for concessionality the present value of this external debt is close to 50%. 
 
Public sector employment 
The public sector wage bill in the WBGS is relatively high, as a ratio of GDP or of 
current expenditure, compared to other Arab countries and other comparable countries 
around the world. The IMF calculated the ratio to GDP, for example, at 15.2% for the 
WBGS in 2000, as against between 6% and 9% in each of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and around 12% in Morocco and Tunisia in 2001 (IMF, 
2003a: 92). For lower-middle-income countries as a whole, wages and salaries 
accounted for approximately 22% of total expenditure during the latter half of the 
1990s (somewhat less than 10 percent of GDP),
5 while Gupta et al (2002) report 
similar shares for a sample of 39 low-income countries (25% of total expenditure and 
7% of GDP). This relatively high ratio for the PA may reflect in part the 2000 fall in 
GDP; but as Table 4.3 shows, the ratio in 1999, before the crisis, was still 11.6% of 
GDP, significantly bigger than comparator countries. The evolution of total 
expenditure is also telling. While in 1996 wage and non-wage expenditures were of 
comparable size, there was some tendency for the former to rise more rapidly with the 
increase in public sector employment, which was around 10% at an annual rate from 
1997 to 2000; and the growth was in both civil service and security jobs. This 
phenomenon was largely a response to strong political pressures to increase public 
sector employment, not least the importance of jobs for returning PLO personnel. 
However, two things should be noted here. First, the WBGS figure does not include 
the significant wage bill for people employed by UNRWA. Second, the distribution of 
new posts was poorly directed: nearly half of public sector workers were employed in   11
the security services, and there continued to be shortages in education, health and the 
judiciary (Erickson von Allmen, 2001: 14).  
(Table 4.3 near here) 
  
 
Fiscal reforms and the 2003 budget 
An attempt was made to deal with some of these weaknesses in the Economic Policy 
Framework which was introduced in June 2000 in response to growing dissatisfaction 
among donors. The diversion of revenues was largely ended, but public sector wage 
employment, which was still only imperfectly controlled by the MoF, continued to 
rise. There was a sharp squeeze on non-wage spending but a continued, albeit slower, 
rise in the wage bill: this was largely the result of a conscious decision by the PA to 
offset, in the way and to the extent that it could, the economic depression associated 
with the Israeli closures.   
 
A second wave of reforms was initiated in June 2002, partly in response to the 
deepening political crisis resulting from Israeli incursions into the WBGS. The most 
important of these reforms were the consolidation of all public revenue – including 
the profits from PA commercial assets – into a Single Treasury Account; the 
introduction of stricter controls on spending, with limits on the growth of employment 
to be properly enforced; increased transparency in the budget; the bringing together of 
all the PA’s commercial assets in the Palestinian Investment Fund, with the 
introduction of policies to prevent monopolistic practices; and moves to reform 
existing pension systems (IMF, 2003a: 102). 
   12
Fundamental to the budget plan for 2003 were an agreement by which the Israeli 
government resumed the transfer of clearance revenues, including the gradual transfer 
of the arrears that had built up since January 2001, and expectations of continued 
external donor support of $535m for recurrent and $212m for development 
expenditure. The budget also envisaged a continuation of the current low level of 
domestic revenue and a freeze on the wage bill, together with a much needed fillip to 
non-wage spending which had been cut in the two previous years. The intention was 
that the transfer of past clearance revenues would be used mainly to reduce the PA’s 
expenditure arrears and repay some bank borrowing, while it was assumed that 
significant external budgetary support would continue.
6  
 
3 FISCAL  CHALLENGES  FOR  A NEW PALESTINIAN STATE 
A political settlement based on the principles spelt out in the introduction to this 
volume (an independent and fully sovereign Palestinian state in the WBGS) will 
change the nature of some of the key features dealt with in the previous section. For 
example, the state will enjoy greater autonomy over the design of its tax structure and 
the problems of fiscal leakages will no longer exist, while relationships with external 
donors may be expected to take on a different character. At the same time, however, 
the new circumstances of independence and the return of refugees will intensify other 
problems and bring with them new fiscal challenges as well. In this section we start 
by considering the macroeconomic constraints within which any future fiscal stance 
must be defined before turning to a range of structural issues. 
 
Defining a sustainable fiscal stance   13
A desirable sustainable fiscal stance should have three different attributes: (i) a tax 
structure which maximises revenue while maintaining tax rates which are stable, 
progressive, but not excessive; (ii) a path for the fiscal deficit which is consistent with 
stable and low inflation, a moderate debt to income ratio and a path for the domestic 
interest rate which does not directly threaten short-term macroeconomic performance; 
and (iii) a fiscal stance that is counter-cyclical and hence capable of smoothing shocks 
to private sector consumption. 
 
One of the striking aspects of the short history of the PA has been the remarkable 
degree of overall fiscal control, at least up to the period of the second intifada, which 
means that the new state can contemplate the design of a fiscal strategy without 
having to deal with the latent fiscal and debt crises that plague many low-income 
countries. As we noted in Section 2, although the PA’s overall budget deficit has been 
substantial since the mid-1990s, this has principally reflected substantial levels of 
(highly concessional) external finance. By contrast, the domestic net borrowing 
requirement (i.e. the overall budget deficit after foreign financing and the 
accumulation of arrears) remained at relatively low levels between 1996 and 1999, 
moving from a deficit of 1.4% of GDP in 1996 to a small surplus of 0.3% of GDP in 
1999 (Table 4.1b). These deficits, which were significantly lower than the 4% of GDP 
average for low-income countries as a whole over the same period (IMF 2003b), 
meant that domestic debt on the eve of the crisis of 2000 was exceptionally low. 
 
The revenue collapse occasioned by the closures of 2000-2002 clearly undercut this 
performance in a dramatic and debt-augmenting way, but the budget (and outturn) for 
2003 has seen the previous flow position more or less restored, even after the   14
elimination of a significant proportion of the domestic arrears that built up during the 
period when revenue clearances from Israel were halted. Partly as a result of the speed 
with which fiscal balance was restored, and partly due to the high level of grant 
financing received from key international donors, this catastrophic fiscal shock saw 
external indebtedness rise to only just over 20% of GDP. 
 
While the relatively low level of debt and high revenue mobilisation are clearly of 
immense value to the putative fiscal regime, they mask a number of structural 
weaknesses in the fiscal setup which ultimately limit the scope for active fiscal 
management. The first is that a significant proportion of tax revenue is raised through 
taxes which are either internationally negotiated (eg customs duties) or where the 
scope for varying rates is likely to be limited (eg VAT). Between 26% and 30% of the 
PA’s revenues during 1998-2000 came from customs duties (either collected directly 
by the PA or reimbursed by Israel, see table 4.1a). This is a little higher than the 
average in low-income countries, but substantially higher than that in lower-middle-
income countries (which is about 13%). Customs duties amounted to 6.1% of the 
WBGS’s GDP in 2000, much more than in other Middle Eastern countries (IMF, 
2003a: 86). These ratios are surprisingly high in the light of the customs union 
arrangements with Israel, the ‘fiscal leakages’ discussed in section 2, the interim 
Association agreement with the EU and a number of free trade arrangements with the 
Arab countries. It is clear, therefore, that the trade regime to be adopted by the 
Palestinian state will have significant effects on the PA’s fiscal revenues. Customs 
duties are typically an easy and accessible source of revenues, and many developing 
countries hesitate to adopt a more rational and ultimately more beneficial trade regime 
in order to preserve that source of income. In the case of Palestine, however, a more   15
appropriate trade regime (such as the non-discriminatory trade regime, recommended 
in chapter 2 of this volume) may actually deliver higher customs revenues than the 
current customs union arrangements with Israel, thereby holding out the prospect that 
a future Palestinian government may be able to reduce customs rates without adverse 
effects on the gross proceeds. Set against this, however, whatever new trade regime 
replaces the Oslo arrangement will require Palestine to put in place a competent 
administrative structure to manage customs control and customs collections, and the 
cost of that may turn out to be higher than the fees currently charged by Israel for 
collecting customs and excises on behalf of the PA.  
 
The relative size of these offsetting effects is difficult to assess (although see World 
Bank, 2002,  chapter 2 for a discussion of possible revenue effects), but whatever the 
change in net revenue yields from trade reforms, it will remain the case that a new 
Palestine will be heavily dependent on trade-based revenues. Since tariff and duty 
rates will continue to be constrained by international negotiation and the need to 
ensure that the trade regime remains competitive, a new Palestinian state is unlikely to 
find itself with much scope for discretionary changes in taxes. 
 
The second, and certainly the most challenging, feature of the current budget is the 
size of the government wage bill. The PA figures may well overstate the size of the 
wage bill if the high level of off-budget expenditure is less labour intensive than that 
reported in the budget, but even so, and setting aside questions of the optimal 
composition of public expenditure, the large size of the public sector wage bill 
presents a serious challenge to efficient fiscal adjustment to adverse revenue shocks, 
especially in an environment of low inflation where any significant real wage   16
adjustments will require correspondingly large nominal adjustments. Even in 
circumstances where employment legislation and public sector unions are relatively 
weak, it is notoriously difficult both to reduce the public sector wage bill when 
downward adjustment is required, and to oppose pressures to increase it in the face of 
positive external or revenue shocks, including aid surges. Tanzi (1993), for example, 
argues that efficiency wage effects are particular severe in public sector employment 
(since public sector employees are often better placed to switch into secondary 
employment in response to real wage cuts). The political economy literature, on the 
other hand, stresses the role of ‘voracity effects’ where the strength of interest groups 
can induce inefficiently large responses to positive revenue shocks and inefficiently 
small responses to negative ones (eg Tornell and Lane, 1999; Adam and O’Connell, 
1999). 
 
One implication of this kind of structural rigidity is that in the face of revenue or 
interest rate shocks requiring expenditure adjustment, the cost of this adjustment will 
fall disproportionately on the non-wage component of the budget and, if evidence 
from elsewhere is any guide, on operations and maintenance expenditure on the 
public capital stock. The exact pattern of adjustment will depend in large measure on 
the fungibility of donor- and NGO-funded projects and programmes. If they are non-
fungible, a much greater share of the cost of fiscal adjustments will fall on the PA’s 
own non-wage budget. 
 
This, in turn, raises two related issues. The first concerns the nature of the fiscal 
shocks a Palestinian budget might face, and the second is whether, and to what extent,   17
the budget deficit may be used to smooth public expenditure, and thereby avoid costly 
non-wage expenditure adjustments. 
 
Revenue and aid volatility 
The revenue account is likely to be vulnerable to two sources of volatility. The first 
arises from the heavy dependence on revenue from tradable goods for which Palestine 
is, and will continue to be, a price-taker, and is likely to have limited discretion over 
tax rates. Given the openness of the Palestinian economy and the likelihood that the 
price elasticity of demand for imports is relatively low, the revenue account is 
therefore vulnerable to real exchange rate shocks which, unless there is rapid pass-
through to public sector wages, will be transmitted rapidly onto either the budget 
deficit or, again, non-wage expenditure. In these circumstances, given the high non-
tradable content of public expenditure, real exchange rate appreciations will tend to be 
budget worsening.  
 
The second major source of vulnerability arises from the continued dependence of the 
budget on foreign aid. In the past foreign (concessional) financing of the PA budget 
has been high and volatile, at 5% of GDP (25% of revenue) in 1998 and 1999, but 
16% in 2002 (more than 100% of domestic revenue). In the future it seems likely that 
foreign aid would be high immediately after a political settlement but would then 
begin to taper off. Aid can affect the budget in two ways. The first is through 
traditional ‘Dutch disease’ channels whereby aid inflows not only stimulate ‘voracity 
effects’ on the expenditure account but, to the extent that they induce an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate, may also reduce the domestic value of trade-based revenues. 
In the case of Palestine, while these Dutch disease effects may be potentially   18
problematic in the medium term, the short-run risks seem less severe since the 
combination of the exchange rate arrangements (discussed in chapter 3) and the likely 
supply side effect of returning refugees is likely to mitigate the tendency for the 
nominal exchange rate to appreciate.  
 
The second, and possibly more difficult, problem is that aid flows tend to be more 
volatile than domestic revenue (Bulir and Lane, 2002). Moreover, and despite the fact 
that some elements of aid, such as food and emergency relief, are explicitly designed 
to be counter-cyclical, there is evidence that for most developing countries aid flows 
are weakly pro-cyclical. This reflects in part the effect of conditional aid programmes 
and the influence of political standoffs between donors and recipients, and in part the 
internal disbursement arrangements of donors. But these points mean that the likely 
continued high levels of aid to Palestine will not necessarily make the fiscal 
management task easier. 
 
Deficit financing and monetary arrangements  
The structural rigidities discussed above are not unique to Palestine, nor are they a 
defining feature of developing countries. In virtually all countries, international 
agreements and domestic political considerations limit discretion on revenue, while 
real wage rigidity and/or high non-distortionary expenditure constrain rapid 
expenditure adjustment. What matters, though is the extent to which deficit financing 
can be used to avoid costly tax rate adjustments and to smooth consumption in the 
face of output or other macroeconomic shocks. It is here that industrialised and 
developing countries are fundamentally different. Gavin and Perotti (1997) find that 
for industrialised countries the fiscal balance is strongly pro-cyclical, improving in   19
good times and falling in bad times. Moreover, this pattern is strongly asymmetric so 
that fiscal deficits increase more in bad times as expenditures increase, than they 
decrease in good times. This pattern – which implies a broadly sustainable fiscal 
stance over the medium term – is consistent with efficient stabilising or tax-smoothing 
arguments in general, and with the idea that recessions are politically more costly (and 
require a more expansionary response) in particular. By contrast, for Latin American 
countries, they find that the fiscal balance is only very weakly pro-cyclical and that 
the cost of fiscal adjustment is overwhelmingly borne by expenditure adjustments. 
Adam and Bevan (2003) extend this analysis, showing that for middle-income 
developing countries the fiscal balance is broadly acyclical and the full weight of 
adjustment to output and hence revenue shocks falls on expenditure. In the lower 
income countries, while this is true for moderate output shocks, there is evidence that 
fiscal deficits are strongly pro-cyclical in response to adverse output shocks. Taken 
together, this suggests a pattern of fiscal response composed of either significant 
expenditure adjustment (in the case of middle-income countries) and/or periodically 
large fiscal deficits in low-income countries, where the latter are typically financed by 
arrears accumulation, unsustainable recourse to inflation tax, and debt default. 
 
Given what has been written elsewhere and the recommendations of chapter 3, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the new state will soon introduce a new currency 
under a currency board arrangement with a peg to the NIS. Assuming that such an 
arrangement was sufficiently credible, this would strictly limit the government’s use 
of central bank finance, and commercial bank borrowing.  There would be some 
seigniorage, but as argued in chapter 3 the likely seigniorage revenue at sensible 
inflation rates would be small. Thus in the short-run the scope for discretionary deficit   20
financing would be heavily circumscribed and all fiscal adjustment would fall on non-
wage expenditure. Over the medium term, however, especially as the domestic debt 
market developed, there may be scope for shifting the task of short-run fiscal 
adjustment from expenditure to the deficit. But the need to maintain credible fiscal 
control will remain a priority. 
 
Traditionally, for a government to ‘tie its hands’ to a fixed exchange rate or a 
currency board arrangement has been seen as a means of enforcing discipline. 
However, Tornell and Velasco (1995) have argued the reverse: by delaying the 
inflationary consequences of fiscal laxity, a fixed exchange rate regime can actually 
induce greater opportunism. Gavin and Perotti (1997) find weak evidence in support 
of this for Latin America, but the only robust evidence on exchange rate regimes and 
fiscal discipline appears to support the view that ‘hard peg’ arrangements do seem to 
foster robust fiscal restraint (Fatas and Rose, 2001). 
 
If greater exchange rate flexibility was pursued, the government could look to 
domestic rule-based mechanisms for fiscal control such as the cash budgets 
increasingly used in many Sub-Saharan African countries. Such rules effectively 
place spending agencies and government as a whole on a cash-in-advance basis, 
thereby limiting the growth in reserve money. Aside from proving an effective 
method for addressing inflation (and domestic arrears) problems, such rules serve to 
embed day-to-day fiscal management in the culture of public policy and tend to 
strengthen the hand of central agencies (i.e. the Ministry of Finance) relative to 
spending agencies. The cost, of course, is that deficit rules necessarily imply a loss of 
discretion and return the whole burden of fiscal adjustment onto expenditure. Clearly   21
there is a trade-off between credibility and discretion; if discretion is at risk of being 
abused, the case for rules is stronger. 
 
Both the fiscal structure and the monetary/currency arrangement therefore imply a 
need for a conservative fiscal policy, such that deficits are kept to low levels even in 
adverse circumstances. Fiscal policy in the future is therefore likely to be unable to 
play anything more than the most minimalist role in stabilising employment and 
output – a position that was tacitly accepted in the 2003 budget. 
 
Fiscal policy choices and structural challenges  
Given the macroeconomic constraints on fiscal policy in a new Palestine, it follows 
that the most obvious challenge lies in maintaining the relatively vigorous growth of 
public revenues and in controlling and limiting the expansion of expenditure. In the 
past, the PA has benefited from the efficiency of the Israeli tax authorities in 
collecting taxes and has itself performed well in securing the documentation for 
reclaiming the money. In a fully sovereign state the Palestinian tax authority will be in 
charge of directly collecting the taxes, and this will require new administrative 
structures and skills, as well as substantial transparency and comprehensive 
enforcement. And if the PA does not continue to collect at least the same proportion 
of taxes to GDP as during the Oslo period, the arguments about fiscal leakage will 
lose much of their force.  
 
 
Attitudes to paying taxes   22
It is hardly surprising that an anti-tax culture flourished among the Palestinians during 
the long years of occupation. People did not see either collective or personal benefits 
in return for paying taxes and tax evasion was considered as a form of resistance 
against the occupiers. Prior to 1994 Palestinians were systematically ‘over-taxed’. 
Taxes to the Civil Administration and the Israeli treasury in the 1980s and early 1990s 
amounted to some 18-24% of GDP. At the same time the level of public expenditure 
was less than 15% of GDP, which ‘is very low compared to other countries and 
implies a net transfer to the treasury’ (UNCTAD 1996: 35).
7 Changing that attitude 
will be difficult and will take time but it is essential, not only to secure sufficient 
public revenues to finance the public services, but also to consolidate the democratic 
foundations of the future Palestinian society. At the same time a successful strategy to 
change attitudes and to enhance social commitment will require significant 
accountability, transparency and public participation in decision-making. 
 
Reconstruction and development expenditure  
A future independent Palestinian state will confront three major expenditure 
challenges: the short-run requirement for large reconstruction and development 
expenditure; the medium term challenge of responding to the demographic change, 
including the consequences of absorbing returnees; and the longer-term challenge of 
funding high quality social services from own resources.  
 
The most pressing challenge will be the need for immediate large-scale infrastructural 
spending to rebuild facilities destroyed by Israeli military action, to establish an 
adequate social and physical infrastructure and to reorganise the road network to 
reintegrate the Palestinian territories. Soon after the signing of the DOP the World   23
Bank designed an emergency assistance programme for the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories with a total cost of $3.7bn over the five-year period 1994-98. The Bank 
estimated that $2.4bn of this would be in the form of public investment, to be 
financed almost entirely by international donations, while the remaining $1.3bn would 
come from private capital inflow. These estimates are no longer valid: some of the 
infrastructural spending was carried out but there has been widespread destruction of 
public and private properties carried out by the Israeli army during the years of the 
second intifada. It is unrealistic to assume that the PA would be able to finance a 
comprehensive reconstruction programme from its own resources. However, it is 
important that the PA should, from the beginning, devote a share of its revenues to 
reconstruction and long term development, not only to emphasise that all expenditure 
should be ultimately financed from own resources in the long run, but also to affirm 
Palestinian national ‘ownership’ of the development strategy. The allocation of a 
modest amount of money to development projects in the PA’s 2003 budget is a 
positive sign in that direction.
8 
 
As the Palestinian government increasingly contributes directly to the finance, as well 
as the design and control, of reconstruction and development efforts the case for an 
integrated budget incorporating all the activities of the public sector is strengthened. 
There are some arguments for maintaining a partition between the recurrent budget 
(predominantly government financed) and the development programme 
(predominantly donor funded), reflecting principally the greater uncertainty over the 
scale and timing of donor funding. However, as the evidence from highly aid-
dependent low-income countries is beginning to suggest, these arguments are 
outweighed by the gains in terms of the coherence and coordination of public   24
expenditure that derive from integrated frameworks for public expenditure 
management. Moreover, the same evidence suggests that an inclusive and integrated 
budgetary framework tends to strengthen the hand of governments relative to donors 
in ensuring that public expenditure as a whole reflects domestic government priorities 
rather than those of external donors.
9  
 
Demographic changes  
Public finance is highly sensitive to demographic change, and Palestine is likely to 
experience significant demographic shifts in the next few years, even without taking 
the issue of returnees into account. The PCBS’s estimates suggest that endogenous 
population growth in the WBGS will decline to 3.2% by the year 2010 (from about 
3.8% in 1999) but labour force growth will outpace that substantially and will reach 
an annual rate of 4.4% (see Davoodi and Erickson von Allmen, 2001). The impact of 
the resulting significant rise in the share of the labour force in total population could 
be ‘unambiguously positive for fiscal revenues’, leading to an increase in fiscal 
revenues by 1.3% of GDP, according to Jenkner (2001: 100). Obviously, this is 
subject to the condition that the economy would be able to provide employment and 
absorb the additional labour force. On the other hand, the same study argues that the 
demographic impact will be ‘less clear for expenditure’, but suggests that the 
reduction in the age-dependency ratio (smaller proportions of people older than 65 
and of school children relative to total population) along with stringent expenditure 
control would reduce expenditure by 1.4% of GDP. Thus, natural demographic 
change in the WBGS by year 2010 would lead to fiscal consolidation, reducing the 
budget deficit by a little less than 3% of GDP.  
   25
The same framework was applied by Jenkner to examine the impact of a possible 
return of 600,000 refugees to the WBGS. She concluded that revenues would rise by a 
further 0.3% of GDP while expenditure would fall, through a further slight reduction 
in the age-dependency ratio, by a further 0.3%. Thus, the budget deficit could shrink 
by a further 0.6% by 2010. The study concluded that ‘Immigration may have 
beneficial macroeconomic and fiscal effects over the medium term – but only if the 
economy is able to generate and sustain employment without undue compression in 
real wages’ (Jenkner, 2001: 111).
10 
 
However, as Jenkner points out in several places in her study, her analysis is based on 
some simple and questionable assumptions: not only that the economy would achieve 
sufficient growth to absorb the ever expanding labour force (at reasonable real 
wages), but also that the policy environment in Palestine would be conducive to 
growth in general and with respect to the tax system and trade regime in particular. 
Equally important is the implicit assertion that current per capita public expenditures, 
by the PA or the UNRWA, whether in the form of social services or infrastructural 
spending, are generally adequate and would be capable of supporting the assumed 
acceleration of growth in the economy.
11  
 
Overall, then, there are no inevitable adverse consequences of the demographic shifts 
which the WBGS are expected to face in the near future. Population increase, and 
labour force growth in particular, could make it easier to pursue a ‘sound’ fiscal 
policy – but this depends crucially on whether the additional labour could be absorbed 
and on the policy decisions which are made with respect to both revenue collection   26
and public expenditure. The PA’s policy decisions could turn the demographic shifts 
into a fiscal blessing or a fiscal curse.   
 
Public services and social expenditure 
Along with the poor state of basic physical infrastructure, the WBGS suffers from 
limited and deteriorating public services which, in a number of important areas, are 
worse than in neighbouring Arab countries. Per-capita consumption of electricity is 
substantially lower than in neighbouring countries, as well as the number of doctors 
per 100,000 inhabitants, fresh water supply and sewage (only 38% of total households 
in the WBGS are connected to sewage networks). Poverty is widespread (20% of 
households in 1998 were earning less than NIS 1460 per month), provision of cultural 
services is extremely limited, illiteracy is as high as 14% (1997), there is a large 
number of pupils per class (37.5 pupils per class at the secondary level and 47.7 
pupils at the elementary level in the UNRWA schools), and over 40% of the 
population are without health insurance of any type.
12  
 
The new Palestinian state is likely to want to assume a significantly wider 
responsibility for social spending of various kinds, notably education and health, 
partly to improve the levels of service currently on offer and partly because it will 
eventually have to take over those services now provided by UNRWA and other 
NGOs. Actually, about 28% of the students enrolled in basic education in the WBGS 
were in UNRWA schools in the school year 1999/2000 (MAS, 2000). Table 4.2 
shows the levels of expenditure by UNRWA in recent years, both in the WBGS and in 
the refugee camps elsewhere. Assuming that most of the residents of the refugee 
camps in neighbouring countries will return to the WBGS (see Arnon and Kanafani,   27
chapter 10 in this volume), then it is not totally unrealistic to suggest that all of this 
expenditure – some $344m in 2003 as against $1278m of expenditure in the PA’s 
budget – will need to be assumed by the PA.  
 
Additional costs will be involved in enhancing the provision, and the quality, of 
public services. Health and unemployment insurance as well as comprehensive 
pension schemes are of particular importance here. However, it is possible to design 
insurance schemes to be self-financing and fiscally neutral (see Sayre and Olmsted, 
chapter 7 in this volume), and this will ease a fiscal burden which is already large 
enough.  
 
The tax system as a policy tool 
Alongside their primary role of providing revenues to fund public expenditure, tax 
systems are often designed to fulfil two other major functions: the redistribution of 
income between different social groups and the stimulation of growth by mobilising 
savings and changing the incentive structure to divert investment and consumption in 
specific directions. 
 
Due to lack of reliable data on household income distribution (see World Bank, 2001: 
26) we rely instead on the distribution of consumption expenditure. Distribution of 
consumption reveals poverty more directly than income distribution, but inequality 
with respect to consumption can also be substantially lower than inequality as 
measured by the distribution of income. Table 4.4 makes clear that while average per 
capita consumption in the West Bank was more than 25% higher than that in Gaza, 
inequality was almost identical in the two regions in 1998. Average consumption of   28
an individual in the richest quintile is about five times that of a person in the poorest 
quintile, and the richest 20% of the population undertake about 40 percent of total 
consumption.  
 [Table 4.4 near here] 
 
This is the sort of inequality that a steeply progressive income tax scheme can aim to 
address. In fact the PA had such a scheme with a high marginal tax rate up to 1999, 
when it was substantially reformed and replaced by a less progressive system with 
lower tax rates. Table 4.5 shows the income tax rates and brackets for 1995-98 and 
since 1999. While in the former case there were eight brackets with tax rates varying 
from 5% to 48%, the structure introduced in 1999 has only four brackets and a top 
rate of 20%. At the same time the corporate tax rate was reduced from 38.5% in the 
West Bank and 37.5% in the Gaza Strip to 20%. This tax reform would appear to have 
undermined both the pursuit of redistribution and the PA’s proceeds from income 
taxes. But the experience of the past decades, in both developed and developing 
countries, has demonstrated that high marginal rates have strong negative effects on 
incentives, and correspond usually with widespread tax evasion and corruption. In 
addition, a highly progressive income tax system requires for its implementation a 
highly sophisticated administrative apparatus. Modern conventional wisdom in public 
finance suggests that a simpler income tax scheme with lower marginal rates leads to 
higher rather than to lower tax proceeds (as the result of simpler administration, 
weaker incentives to evade and stronger incentives to earn). Modern thinking in 
public finance also stresses that a progressive income tax can play only a limited role 
in bringing about substantial redistribution of income, and that this can be more 
efficiently achieved via the allocation of public expenditure. Thus the PA’s income   29
tax reform does make economic sense and may actually lead to larger tax proceeds. 
But this also implies that more emphasis should be placed on public expenditure to 
achieve equity targets.  
[Table 4.5 near here] 
 
Redistribution could also be pursued by the imposition of excises and special 
purchase taxes (and high customs duties) on luxury goods. But the trade off between 
equity objectives and maximisation of the tax proceeds is even stronger here than with 
progressive income taxes: to maximise the proceeds, excise should be imposed on 
goods with low price elasticity of demand, but these goods are usually income 
inelastic (since they are consumed also by the poor). The chronic dilemmas between 
the efficiency, neutrality and equity objectives of the tax system are behind the near-
universal tendency to depend increasingly on VAT to finance public expenditure. The 
main attractions of this indirect tax are its relative simplicity, its low ‘excess burden’ 
and its limited distortionary effects. However, VAT is an unambiguously regressive 
tax, especially when it is set at the same rate on all goods. As already noted, the Paris 
Protocol required the PA to set VAT at a rate close to Israel’s. The main aim behind 
this was to prevent harmful consequences to the Israeli economy in the absence of a 
customs border with the WBGS. UNCTAD (1996: 33) had earlier argued forcefully 
that ‘Fifteen percent is a very high rate for the Palestinian economy in its present state 
of development. A much lower rate may be considered more appropriate from the 
viewpoint of equity and growth consideration,’ while the rates on the newly 
introduced VAT in Jordan and Lebanon were set at 13% and 10% respectively. 
Jordan’s proceeds from a 13% rate amounted to 8.2% of its GDP in year 2001 while 
the 17% rate brought VAT revenues equal to 7.2% of GDP only in year 2000 in the   30
WBGS and 10.4% in Israel (IMF 2003a: 86). This may be due to the narrow base of 
the (high) VAT rate in the WBGS, which suggests that it would be possible to reduce 
the VAT rate without negatively affecting the tax proceeds provided the tax base was 
expanded (one reason for the narrowness of the tax base in the WBGS is the 
preponderance of small enterprises which under the Paris Protocol are exempted from 
VAT). On the other hand, the regressive nature of the tax can be eased either by 
introducing multiple VAT rates (lower on basic staple foods and services) or by 
exempting these goods and services from VAT altogether. But these measures imply, 
of course, narrowing the tax base.
13  
 
The second major function of a tax system is to stimulate growth by mobilising 
savings and changing the incentive structure to direct investment and consumption in 
specific directions. However, the idea that higher taxes can increase savings and 
investment is now subject to serious doubts as governments’ propensity to consume 
has proved to be in many instances much higher than that of the private sector. The 
PA has deployed the income tax tool to encourage investment. Under the investment 
promotion law most investment projects benefit from income tax holidays during the 
first ten years of operation. This explains why almost all of the modest amount of 
income taxes collected in the WBGS came from individuals rather than from 
companies. But the experiences of other countries do not show that such tax 
exemptions substantially encourage corporate investments (Naqib, 1996). Many 
countries also use variation in income tax rates as a tool in their regional development 
policy, to encourage investment in underprivileged regions.
14 It may be argued that 
property in general, and real estate in particular, is under-taxed in the WBGS, and that 
more appropriate taxation here would moderate the strong historic tendency for a   31
substantial amount of domestic investment to be directed towards residential 
construction. Much will depend here on the future influx of the returnees and the fate 
of the housing units in the Israeli settlements in the WBGS (see Arnon and Kanafani, 
chapter 10 in this volume). What remains certain, however, is that the clash between 
using the tax structure as incentive instrument and maximising public revenues will 
remain a major dilemma for policy makers.      
 
4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the Oslo period the PA succeeded in creating new budgetary mechanisms where 
none had previously existed, increasing its revenues to internationally respectable 
levels, and keeping overall deficits and debt under control, at least up to the start of 
the second intifada in late 2000. However, the PA relied heavily on indirect taxes to 
generate revenue, the clearance arrangements were a source of vulnerability (as 
demonstrated in 2001-2 when the Israeli government refused to transfer the revenues 
it collected), the PA’s accounts were not comprehensive (some revenues and 
expenditures were effectively off-budget), and its spending, with respect to public 
sector employment in particular, was not firmly under control. The overall 
performance was also heavily dependent on foreign aid, and there was an undesirable 
split between recurrent and development budgets. The intifada created additional 
pressures on the budget, and one outcome of these was an intensification of fiscal 
reform from 2002. 
 
A new Palestinian state, which will inherit its basic budgetary arrangements from the 
PA, will face a series of new challenges in a variety of areas. It would be hard to 
change the fiscal structure significantly even in the medium term, which means that   32
revenue will continue to be subject to volatility arising from external trade and aid 
shocks, while expenditure is difficult to adjust. Moreover, the likely monetary and 
currency arrangements – in the form of a currency board peg to the NIS and later a 
hard peg to the euro, as discussed in chapter 3 – will limit the possibility of  deficit 
financing. Hence the fiscal structure, on the one hand, and the likely monetary 
arrangements, on the other, indicate the need for a conservative fiscal policy, with 
budget deficits to be kept low even in adverse circumstances. At the same time the 
new state will need to grapple with the development of public services (and the take-
over of those currently provided by UNRWA and other NGOs), the demand for large-
scale reconstruction and development, demographic changes and the return of 
refugees.  
 
Efforts should be made to enhance public revenues through broadening the tax base 
rather than increasing the tax rates. Equity issues are probably better dealt with via 
expenditure policy rather than high marginal taxes. Foreign support to the PA’s 
budget, which has been so important, is unlikely to decline abruptly in the early years 
after the establishment of the new state. Thus  international good will, together with 
compensation from Israel (as argued in chapter 10), would allow the new authority to 
spend more than it collects for some years. What is essential however is to start 
planning, from the beginning, to achieve a sustainable fiscal stance in the foreseeable 
future. The fiscal challenges are not insuperable but the momentum of the reforms, 
which the PA has already initiated, will need to be maintained and taken further, not 
least in the areas of transparency and involving the public at large in selecting the 
priorities and deciding upon their ranking.  
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NOTES 
 
1 GDP estimates for WBGS remain highly tentative.  The values used in Table 4.1b 
are taken from IMF (2003a, 23: Table 2.2).  
2 The World Development Report 2004 (World Bank, 2003) defines lower-middle 
income countries as those with per capita Gross National Income in 2002 of between 
$736 and $2934, based on the World Bank Atlas Method. 
3 The Paris Protocol, the economic agreement within the Oslo Accords, required the 
PA to levy VAT at a minimum of 15% compared with the rate in Israel which was 
then at 17%. Israel increased its VAT rate to 18% in mid 2002, and the PA is 
generally following the Israeli rate. The Protocol specified also that VAT exemption 
can be applied only to businesses with annual turnover of less than $12,000.      
4 Israel began in 2000 to transfer some purchase tax revenue on Palestinian purchases 
of Israeli goods, but a methodology put forward by the PA for taking account of the 
customs duties and purchase tax on indirect imports was rejected by the Israeli 
government in the summer of 2000 (IMF, 2003a: 87). 
5 World Development Indicators (2001). 
6 Preliminary indications from the monthly reports published on the internet by the 
MoF (at http://www.mof.gov.ps/reports.htm, accessed 12 January 2004) suggest that 
both revenues and the wage bill were slightly above plan, and external finance was 
well below the expected level. The PA was therefore cutting back on non-wage 
spending, repaying less arrears than hoped, and borrowing from rather than repaying 
the domestic banking sector. 
7 Until 1994 most of the taxes paid by the Palestinians went directly to the Israeli 
treasury and expenditure by the Civil Administration, the Israeli body which was in 
charge of running the WBGS, and spending by municipalities was limited to the   35
 
revenues collected by them (taxes, fees and utility tariffs). The shortfall between the 
revenues collected by the Civil Administration and the amount of taxes that were 
actually paid by the Palestinians led to what the World Bank called ‘fiscal 
compression and underfinancing of public sector investment needs’. During the 1970-
90 period, public sector capital expenditure amounted to a mere 3.5% of GDP in the 
Occupied Territories, which was significantly below the average for developing 
countries (World Bank, 1993 vol 1:10).  
8 There is a ‘fungibility’ risk here, though: the PA has allocated some resources to 
urgent development projects because of the lack of foreign aid to finance such 
projects, but when foreign finance becomes available, the PA might shift those 
resources back to financing recurrent expenditure.  
9 The difficulties of classifying expenditures are well known. For example, 
expenditure on education and health which are in the recurrent budget could also be 
considered as investment expenditure which would increase the economy’s 
productive capacity in future.  
10 The Jenkner study did not take account of the point that the PA will have to take 
responsibility for all the services currently provided by the UNRWA, whether for the 
refugees that are resident in the WBGS or for the 600,000 returning refugees. She 
made a very rough estimate of these costs, putting them at $394m per year (some 9% 
of GDP in 2000), and concluded that ‘Obviously, such an expense could not be 
covered by an improved revenue effort alone but highlights that sustained donor 
support will be required together with stringent expenditure controls in the PA’ 
(Jenkner, 2001: 110).     36
 
11 Text books in public finance stress the importance of Wagner’s Law according to 
which the relative weight of the public sector (as a percentage of GDP) tends to 
increase with the increase in per-capita income. As often with these types of trends, it 
is difficult to establish strictly the line of causality. However, the endogenous growth 
theory literature argues that long-term growth can depend heavily on the level and 
nature of public expenditure and the strategy underlying it.   
12 For information about the state of the physical infrastructure see Mody (1999). 
Comprehensive coverage of various social/cultural indicators are available in MAS 
Social Monitor (2000 and 2001). 
13 The adoption of multiple VAT rates involves administrative difficulties as well as a 
higher degree of distortion in relative prices. There is a trade off between equity 
(based on the concept of ‘ability to pay’ and the notion that the richer should pay 
more) and distortions: the least distorting tax is a ‘neutral’ tax, a tax which leaves the 
relative prices of goods and services intact. Lebanon’s 10% VAT was introduced in 
February 2002, but with the exemption of a relatively long list of activities and goods 
including livestock and raw agricultural products, bread, milk, yoghurt, pasta, baby 
food, feed, books and newspapers, gas for household consumption, agricultural 
machinery, medicines, etc. The Lebanese Ministry of Finance expects the 10% VAT 
to produce revenues equal to 4% of GDP (See the VAT Law, Ministry of Finance, 
December 2001 at: http://www.finance.gov.lb/main/vat/vatlaw_e02.pdf (accessed on 
January 1, 2004).  
14 Regional imbalance is apparent in the WBGS, not only between Gaza and the West 
Bank, as made clear in table 4.4, but also within each area. About one-half of the poor   37
 
in Palestine live in three districts: Khan Yunis, Gaza City and Hebron (World Bank 
2001: 6).   38
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Table 4.1a: The budget of the PA, 1996-2003, (in NIS m) 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1
Revenue (actual)  2,059  2,785 3,300 3,898 3,829 1,148  1,574 5,057
1. Domestic Revenue   937  1,143 1,233 1,498 1,434 1,148  1,018 1,037
Tax revenue   663  735 865 1026 982 759  640 593
   Income tax   168  228 260 310 278 177  145 
   VAT   209  268 316 367 393 323  271 
   Customs duties   76  75 94 144 98 33  13 
   Property tax   3  22667   4 
   Excises   207  162 193 199 207 219  207 
Non-tax revenue  274  408 368 472 452 389  378 444
   Transportation fees   72  112 110 117 117 98  51 
   Health insurance   40  44 55 83 75 46  64 
   Health fees   30  35 39 38 40 33  27 
   Others   132  217 164 234 220 212  236 
2. Revenue from clearances
2   1,124  1,642 2,066 2,400 2,395 1,749  1,620 1,620
Customs duties   226  476 780 1.030 1.013 736  740 
VAT   543  709 777 844 907 708  620 
Petroleum excises   303  371 406 415 371 305  260 
Income tax   13  18 35 26 27 0  0 
Health fees   20  28 35 36 27 0  0 
Other clearances   19  40 33 49 50 0  0 
    Actual disbursement   1,122  1,642 2,067 2,400 2,395 0  556 4,020
          
Expenditure 3,420  3,899 4,084 4,893 4,946 4,714  4,980 6,394
1. Total current expenditure   2,647  2,994 3,188 3,902 4,891 4,621  4,937 5,198
Wage bill   1,286  1,622 1,774 2,147 2,537 2,862  3,124 3,123
Non-wage   1.361  1.372 1.414 1.755 2.354 1,759  1,813 2,075
      
Recurrent Balance   -588  -209 112 -4 -1,062 -3,473  -3,363 -141
      
2. Total capital expenditure  773  905 896 991 55 93  43 1,195
      
Overall Balance   -1,361  -1,114 -784 -995 -1.117 -3,566  -3,406 -1,337
      
Total Financing  1,361  1,114 784 995 1,117 3,566  3,406 -1,337
 Foreign  1,197 1,043 907 1,014 221 2,238 2,214 3,735
  Direct current expenditure  157  20 2 23 0 0  88 
  External budget support  267 118 9 0 221 2,238  2,126 2,675
  Direct capital expenditure  773  905 896 991 0 0  0 1,060
 Domestic         
  Expenditure arrears   0  18 288 42 268 978  558 -2,075
  Net borrowing (residual)  164  53 -411 -61 628 350  634 -324
Notes: 1 planned budget; 2 including payments withheld.  
Source: adapted from IMF(2003, Table 4.2) and the PA’s MoF website 
(www.mof.gov.ps).   43
Table 4.1b. The budget of the PA, 1996-2002 (in % of GDP) 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Revenue (actual)  17.6% 20.1% 20.4% 20.8% 21.1%  7.2% 11.2%
1. Domestic Revenue   8.0% 8.3% 7.6% 8.0% 7.9% 7.2% 7.2%
  Tax revenue   5.7% 5.3% 5.3% 5.5% 5.4%  4.8% 4.5%
  Nontax revenue  2.3% 2.9% 2.3% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.7%
2.  Tax  clearances         
  Accrual  9.6% 11.9% 12.8% 12.8% 13.2% 11.0% 11.5%
  Actual  9.6% 11.9% 12.8% 12.8% 13.2% 0.0% 3.9%
         
Expenditure 29.2% 28.2% 25.2% 26.2% 27.3%  29.7% 35.3%
1. Total current expenditure   22.6% 21.6% 19.7% 20.9% 27.0% 29.2% 35.0%
Wage bill   11.0% 11.7% 11.0% 11.5% 14.0%  18.1% 22.2%
Nonwage   11.6% 9.9% 8.7% 9.4% 13.0% 11.1% 12.9%
         
Recurrent Balance   -5.0% -1.5% 0.7% 0.0% -5.9% -21.9% -23.9%
         
2. Total capital expenditure  6.6% 6.5% 5.5% 5.3% 0.3% 0.6% 0.3%
         
Overall Balance   -11.6% -8.1% -4.8% -5.3% -6.2%  -22.5% -24.2%
         
Total Financing  11.6% 8.1% 4.8% 5.3% 6.2% 22.5% 24.2%
 Foreign  10.2% 7.5% 5.6% 5.4% 1.2% 14.1% 15.7%
  Direct current expenditure  1.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6%
  External budget support  2.3% 0.9% 0.1% 0.0% 1.2% 14.1% 15.1%
  Direct Capital Expenditure  6.6% 6.5% 5.5% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Domestic   
  Expenditure arrears   0.0% 0.1% 1.8% 0.2% 1.5% 6.2% 4.0%
  Net borrowing (residual)  1.4% 0.4% -2.5% -0.3% 3.5% 2.2% 4.5%
   
Memorandum Items   
  GDP (US$m)  3668 4009 4258 4517 4442  3765 2974
  NIS/US$  3.19 3.45 3.8 4.14 4.08  4.21 4.74
Source: See Table 4.1a 
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Table 4.2 UNRWA’s regular budget by programme and field (US$000) 
 
     West Bank 
2002       2003 
       Gaza 
2002       2003 
Total UNRWA* 
2002          2003 
      
EDUCATION PROGRAMME 
General Education 
    Elementary Education 
    Preparatory Education 
    Secondary Education  




















26,963    28,176 
20,506    21,687 
13,416    14,100 
  7,090      7,587 
   0             0 
  5,017      5,012 
     636         639 
     804         838 
 
12,410      12,704 
  9,394        9,636 
   1,738        1,764 
     684           698 
     594           606 
 
 4,982           5,156 
 4,106           4,277 
     702             702 
      174            177 
 
 6,456           6,514 
 
 2,374            2,142 
 
53,185          54,692 
57,077    60,171 
53,467    56,452 
32,852    34,477 
20,615     21,975 
0 
 2,122       2,168 
0                 0 
 1,488        1,551  
 
16,764       17,305 
11,435        11,924 
  3,450          3,468 
   1,409         1,436 
      470           477 
 
11,748        12,211 
10,679         11,140 
     868              866 
     201              205 
 
 8,311             8,393 
 
 2,156            1,387 
 
90,056           99,467 
172,255        179,066 
150,458        156,952 
   91,934        95,141 
   56,956         60,017 
     1,568           1,794 
    13,563        13,715 
      1,097          1,102 
      7,137          7,297 
 
58,911           60,662 
42,201            43,686 
  9,375              9,505 
   4,320             4,407 
   3,015             3,064 
 
33,630           34,908 
29,423           30,669 
  2,770              2,781 
   1,437             1,458 
 
61,422           65,916 
 
 4,530              3,529 
 
330,748        344,081 
* Total in all fields of operations, i.e. Jordan, Syria and Lebanon as well as Geneva 
headquarters. Ref UNRWA’S Web (accessed 3.12.2003) 
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Table 4.3 The PA’s employment and wage bill 
 1995  1999  2002 
Employment (1000) 
     Civil Service 
      Security 
 
Wage bill (mill NIS) 
    Civil Service 
    Security 
 




























IMF (2003)   46
Table 4.4 Inequality in Palestine: 
consumption expenditure per capita by Quintile, 1998 
Quintile (fifth)  West Bank 
US  $            Per 
cent   
Gaza Strip 








3,027           39.0  
1,762           22.7 
1,324           17.1 
1,007           12.9 
   636             8.2 
1,551 
2,227             39.7 
1,245             22.2 
   937             16.7 
   727             13.0 
   472               8.4 
1,122 
                   The World Bank (2001). 
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Table 4.5 Income brackets and tax rates 
        Pre-reform: 1995-1998 
Income bracket (NIS)       tax rate 
        Post-reform: since 1999 
Income bracket (NIS)        Tax rate 
From            1 – 4.200              5% 
From     4,201 – 10,500          10% 
From   10,501 – 16,800          15% 
From   16,801 – 29,400          20% 
From   29,401 – 50,400          30% 
From   50,401 – 84.000          35% 
From   84,001 – 147.000        40% 
From 147,001 – above           48% 
Corporate tax:  
       Gaza Strip                       37.5% 
       West Bank                      38.5% 
 
 
From            1 – 27,000             5% 
From   27,501 –  66.000           10% 
From   66,001 – 110,000          15% 





      WBGS                                 20% 
Ministry of Finance (cited in Erickson von Allmen, 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 